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Comorbidity between depression and
anxiety: assessing the role of bridge mental
states in dynamic psychological networks
Robin N. Groen1* , Oisín Ryan2, Johanna T. W. Wigman1, Harriëtte Riese1, Brenda W. J. H. Penninx3, Erik J. Giltay4,
Marieke Wichers1 and Catharina A. Hartman1
Abstract
Background: Comorbidity between depressive and anxiety disorders is common. A hypothesis of the network
perspective on psychopathology is that comorbidity arises due to the interplay of symptoms shared by both
disorders, with overlapping symptoms acting as so-called bridges, funneling symptom activation between symptom
clusters of each disorder. This study investigated this hypothesis by testing whether (i) two overlapping mental
states “worrying” and “feeling irritated” functioned as bridges in dynamic mental state networks of individuals with
both depression and anxiety as compared to individuals with either disorder alone, and (ii) overlapping or non-
overlapping mental states functioned as stronger bridges.
Methods: Data come from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). A total of 143 participants
met criteria for comorbid depression and anxiety (65%), 40 participants for depression-only (18.2%), and 37 for
anxiety-only (16.8%) during any NESDA wave. Participants completed momentary assessments of symptoms (i.e.,
mental states) of depression and anxiety, five times a day, for 2 weeks (14,185 assessments). First, dynamics between
mental states were modeled with a multilevel vector autoregressive model, using Bayesian estimation. Summed
average lagged indirect effects through the hypothesized bridge mental states were compared between groups.
Second, we evaluated the role of all mental states as potential bridge mental states.
Results: While the summed indirect effect for the bridge mental state “worrying” was larger in the comorbid group
compared to the single disorder groups, differences between groups were not statistically significant. The
difference between groups became more pronounced when only examining individuals with recent diagnoses (< 6
months). However, the credible intervals of the difference scores remained wide. In the second analysis, a non-
overlapping item (“feeling down”) acted as the strongest bridge mental state in both the comorbid and anxiety-
only groups.
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Conclusions: This study empirically examined a prominent network-approach hypothesis for the first time using
longitudinal data. No support was found for overlapping mental states “worrying” and “feeling irritable” functioning
as bridge mental states in individuals vulnerable for comorbid depression and anxiety. Potentially, bridge mental
state activity can only be observed during acute symptomatology. If so, these may present as interesting targets in
treatment, but not prevention. This requires further investigation.
Keywords: Network analysis, Comorbidity, Depression, Anxiety, Bridge symptoms, Time series, Intensive longitudinal
data, Ecological momentary assessment
Background
Comorbidity between depressive and anxiety disorders is
common. For instance, of the individuals with a primary
depression diagnosis in the Netherlands Study of Depres-
sion and Anxiety (NESDA), 67% had a current and 75%
had a lifetime comorbid anxiety disorder diagnosis [1].
Similarly, of those with a primary anxiety disorder diagno-
sis, 63% had a current and 81% a lifetime depressive
disorder diagnosis [1]. Although comorbidity rates in
community samples are slightly lower [2, 3], the rates re-
ported in NESDA are in line with other studies in primary
and clinical settings [4, 5]. Comorbidity is consistently as-
sociated with higher illness severity, chronicity, and im-
pairments in everyday life [4, 6, 7]. It is well-known that
the presence of one of the disorders acts as a risk factor
for developing the other [3, 8, 9]. This holds not only on a
disorder level but also on a symptom level, with a meta-
analysis by Jacobson and Newman [9] showing that symp-
toms of depression and anxiety predicted each other over
weeks and months. Experiencing symptoms of one of
these disorders may thus be associated with a higher risk
of onset of symptoms of the second disorder.
A heightened risk of developing symptoms of a second
disorder can be understood from a network perspective
on psychopathology, in which causal interactions be-
tween symptoms are theorized to drive the development
of psychopathology including comorbidity [10]. Central
to the network perspective is the proposition that psy-
chiatric disorders arise due to symptoms triggering other
symptoms over time, such as when, for instance, feeling
listless makes it difficult to become active during the
day, which later in the day results in increased sadness
and restlessness because a person did not accomplish
what he/she intended to do. Hypothetically, the stronger
the depression symptoms from the above example trig-
ger one another over time (i.e., the higher the network
density), the more difficult it might be to disrupt the ac-
tivation which eventually may result in the onset of a de-
pressive disorder. This perspective also offers some
potential explanations of comorbidity. For example, we
can consider both anxiety and depression symptoms as
subclusters in an overall network of psychopathology,
including some symptoms that are shared between both
disorders, the so-called overlapping symptoms. An inter-
est in overlapping symptoms to explain comorbidity
rates is not new (e.g., [11]). However, whereas previously
it was examined whether comorbidity rates could be at-
tributed to the presence of these symptoms ([12, 13]
found no support, but see [14] also), in the network ap-
proach, these symptoms are hypothesized to play an ac-
tive role in the development of comorbidity [10, 15]. If
there are no direct interactions between anxiety and de-
pression symptoms (as depicted in Fig. 1 (a)), we would
expect there to be no comorbidity of both disorders. If
such symptoms, like worrying [16] or irritability [17],
share strong relationships with symptoms from each in-
dividual disorder, then the symptoms of disorder A may
activate the symptoms of disorder B indirectly through
these symptoms (as depicted in Fig. 1 (b)). An alternative
view posits that any symptom, so also symptoms that
are specific to only one of the two disorders, could po-
tentially act as a bridge between disorder (e.g., [18, 19]).
This is depicted in Fig. 1 (c), where symptom activation
from the depression-cluster to the anxiety-cluster via
non-overlapping anxiety and depression symptoms
would too lead to comorbidity.
Multiple cross-sectional network studies have addressed
comorbidity between depressive and anxiety disorders [10,
16–26]. In these studies, symptoms of both diagnoses
were combined into one network structure, with symptom
connections reflecting the statistical relationships between
symptoms when the value of all other symptoms variables
is controlled for. Symptoms belonging to the same dis-
order tended to be more strongly connected to symptoms
of the same disorder than to symptoms of the other, co-
morbid disorder ([15, 16, 18–26], but see [10] as excep-
tion). Each study identified at least one symptom in the
network that connected both to symptoms of the same
disorder and to the symptom cluster belonging to the sec-
ond, comorbid disorder. However, these symptoms were
not always overlapping symptoms (e.g., [18, 19]). Irre-
spective of which bridge symptom conceptualization (i.e.,
overlapping or non-overlapping symptoms) was used, the
structures of cross-sectional networks revealed patterns
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that we might expect based on the bridge symptom
hypothesis.
However, cross-sectional network patterns may not re-
flect symptom activation within a person over time [27–
29]. The use of intra-individual time series to model net-
work structures has two immediate advantages over the
use of cross-sectional data: first, patterns of dependence
within-person can be directly established, avoiding well-
known problems with ergodicity [27–29], and second,
time-series analysis allows us to establish time-lagged
(i.e., temporal) dependencies between symptoms often
discussed as a necessary though not sufficient condition
for the presence of a causal relationship [30]. Temporal
networks based on simulated intra-individual time series
in which comorbidity could only arise via bridge symp-
toms showed promising results [31], in that they repro-
duced prevalence rates of major depressive disorder
(MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and
their comorbidity as reported by the National Comor-
bidity Survey Replication (NCS-R [32]). The bridge
symptom hypothesis has not been investigated yet using
empirical time-series data. A next step would thus be to
investigate whether the expected temporal pattern is ob-
served in networks based on intra-individual time series
of individuals diagnosed with comorbid depression and
anxiety. To this end, ecological momentary assessment
(EMA) designs could be used, in which momentary ex-
periences of symptoms are assessed by asking partici-
pants’ multiple days, and multiple times per day to
report on their current mental state (e.g., feeling sad or
anxious). Although these mental states map onto symp-
toms listed in diagnostic criteria of depressive and anx-
iety disorders, and could therefore be considered as daily
proxies of symptoms, they are not symptoms. For the re-
mainder of this paper, we will refer to such momentary
experiences of symptoms and affect assessed with EMA
as “mental states.”
In the current paper, we investigate the bridge symp-
tom hypothesis using EMA data. Investigating whether
we can detect within-individual temporal associations
corresponding with this hypothesis is novel. We used
data from participants in the Netherlands Study of De-
pression and Anxiety [33], who had been diagnosed with
depression, anxiety, or both, and reported on multiple
depression and anxiety mental states, multiple times a
day, for 2 weeks. As such, this dataset provides the op-
portunity to study whether bridge mental states are
stronger in the within-day mental state dynamics in indi-
viduals with comorbid depression and anxiety to those
with either single disorder. A priori, we hypothesized
that two overlapping mental states “feeling irritated” and
“worrying,” reflecting momentary expressions of shared
symptoms (i.e., irritability and repetitive negative think-
ing) of depression and anxiety, would function as bridge
mental states. In this paper, we consider a mental state
to be a “bridge” between two clusters of mental states
from different syndromes if indirect effects from depres-
sion mental states to anxiety mental states and/or vice
versa travel via this mental state (Fig. 2). The degree to
which a symptom acts as a bridge can thus be quantified
by the strength of all those indirect effects. Our first aim
was to test whether overlapping mental states functioned
as stronger “bridges” in the network of individuals with
comorbid disorders as compared to individuals with sin-
gle disorders. Our second aim was to evaluate the as-
sumption that overlapping mental states are more likely
to act as bridge mental states than are non-overlapping
mental states [15]. In the “Discussion” section of this
paper, we synthesize our results, identify and elaborate
on the barriers to using this type of analytic approach to
Fig. 1 Network account of comorbidity. The small circles represent different symptoms, and the edges between them represent uni- or bidirectional
associations over time. The larger circles represent clusters of symptoms of different diagnostic syndromes. The two symptoms (i.e., B1 and B2), which
are part of both larger circles, are overlapping symptoms. These are common to both diagnostic syndromes. In scenario A, the overlapping symptoms
are not activated as part of either diagnostic syndrome; therefore, no comorbidity between depression and anxiety arises. In scenario B, overlapping
symptoms function as bridge symptoms between both diagnostic syndromes, resulting in comorbidity. In scenario C, comorbidity arises due to non-
overlapping symptoms (i.e., D3 and A1) functioning as bridges between diagnostic syndromes
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investigate causal relationships between mental states,
and suggest multiple areas for future research.
Methods
Preregistration
The aims and analyses of the current paper were prere-
gistered on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
jwuz9). When deviations from the preregistered analyses
occurred, reasons for this are explained in the footnotes.
More detail about the preregistration, deviations, and
sensitivity analyses can be found in Additional File 1
[34–39].
Sample selection
The current study used data collected in a subsample of
participants that completed the Ecological Momentary As-
sessment & Actigraphy add-on study of the Netherlands
Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA-EMAA).
NESDA is an ongoing multisite longitudinal cohort study
of Dutch adults (at baseline: n = 2981; age 18–65 years),
with and without depressive and/or anxiety disorders who
were recruited from community settings, and primary and
secondary healthcare settings. Participants were excluded
if they (i) had a primary diagnosis of psychotic, obsessive-
compulsive, bipolar, or severe addiction disorder or (ii)
were not fluent in Dutch. See [33] for a detailed descrip-
tion of the rationale, objectives, and methods of NESDA.
Six measurement waves, including the baseline measure-
ment, have so far been completed in NESDA.
At the sixth measurement wave (2014–2017), NESDA-
EMAA took place. Inclusion criteria of this add-on study
were: participation in at least two previous NESDA waves,
participation in the regular interview ≤ 31 days prior to
starting the EMA measurements, and being familiar with
smartphone use. Based on participants’ diagnostic history
(derived from diagnostic interviews conducted at each
NESDA wave), we selected NESDA-EMAA participants
(n = 220) that had > 30%1 completed EMA assessments
and could be allocated to one of the following three
groups: (i) comorbid depression and anxiety at any
NESDA measurement wave (n = 143), (ii) only depression
at any NESDA measurement wave (n = 40), and (iii) only
anxiety at any NESDA measurement wave (n = 37). Par-
ticipants were assigned to the comorbidity group if they
met criteria for both a depressive disorder (MDD or dys-
thymia) and an anxiety disorder (generalized anxiety dis-
order (GAD), panic disorder with (out) agoraphobia,
agoraphobia, or social phobia) at the most recent or any
prior NESDA wave. The episodes of depression or anxiety
had to occur at the same NESDA wave. Individuals diag-
nosed with depression and anxiety at different waves were
not included as part of the comorbidity group. Partici-
pants who met criteria for a depressive disorder at any
NESDA wave and did not meet criteria for an anxiety dis-
order at any NESDA wave became the depression-only
group. Likewise, participants were assigned to the
anxiety-only group if they met criteria for an anxiety
Fig. 2 Hypothetical network of comorbid depression (DEP1–DEP3) and anxiety (ANX1 and ANX2), in which bridge mental states (i.e., momentary
experiences of symptoms) (B1 and B2) funnel the activity from one mental state cluster to the other. The lines within the two mental state
clusters show the within-cluster associations between the mental states. The four arrows show possible indirect effects from depression mental
state 1 (DEP1)→ bridge mental state 1 (B1)→ anxiety mental state 1 (ANX1), and vice versa, from anxiety mental state 2→ bridge mental state
2→ depression mental state 3. The indirect effects via the bridge mental states, such as A*B in the figure, are hypothesized to be stronger in the
network of individuals with comorbid depression and anxiety, as compared to individuals with either disorder
1Four participants, who based on their diagnostic history could be
allocated to the comorbidity group (n = 1), depression-only group
(n = 2), or anxiety-only group (n = 1), were excluded due to complet-
ing < 30% of EMA assessments. We do not think that excluding these
four individuals has influenced our results.
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disorder at any NESDA wave, but did not meet criteria
for a depressive disorder at any NESDA wave. However,
some of the participants (n = 15; 40.5%) in the anxiety-
only group met criteria for a depressive disorder prior to
NESDA (> 9 years ago), see page 2 in Additional File 1,
for further details on group allocation.
For a more detailed description of the NESDA-EMAA
recruitment procedure and inclusion criteria, see [40].
The research protocols of both the main NESDA study
and EMAA add-on study were approved by the Ethical
Review Board of the VU University Medical Center and
thereafter by the local ethical committees of the partici-
pating centers. All participants gave verbal and written
informed consent.
Design
NESDA-EMAA participants were asked to complete five
EMA questionnaires a day according to a fixed sampling
scheme with 3-h intervals, for 2 weeks. Questions con-
cerned participants’ current mental state, activities, and
company and took between 3 and 5min to complete. Dur-
ing each day, at the appointed times, participants received
a text message on their smartphones with a link to an on-
line EMA questionnaire. Participants had to complete the
questionnaire within 60min after the prompt, but were
encouraged to do so as soon as possible (preferably within
15min of the prompt). The questionnaires were adminis-
tered and stored via Roqua (www.roqua.nl). If participants
answered at least 80% of all diary questions, they received
a 20-euro gift-card as remuneration as well as a personal-
ized report of their own EMA responses. The EMA proto-
col has been described in detail elsewhere [41].
Measurements
Ecological momentary assessments
Of the 16 questions on current mental states (positive
and negative affect) and cognitions (see [40] for a
complete list), we selected seven questions,2 which most
directly reflect depression, anxiety, and bridge mental
states. Items were translated from Dutch. The three se-
lected depression mental states were as follows: “I feel
listless/apathetic” (LIS; “Ik voel me lusteloos), “I feel
down” (DOW; “Ik voel me somber”), and “I do not feel
cheerful” (CHE; reverse coded from “Ik voel me opge-
wekt”). The two anxiety items were as follows: “I feel
nervous” (NER; “Ik voel me nerveus”) and “I do not feel
relaxed” (REL; reverse coded from “Ik voel me ontspan-
nen”). The two bridge mental states were as follows: “I
worry/brood a lot” (WOR; “Ik pieker veel”) and “I feel ir-
ritated” (IRR; “Ik voel me geïrriteerd”). Participants were
asked to rate the extent to which they experienced each
mental state at the moment of assessment on a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very.”
Diagnostic interview
The Composite International Diagnostic Interview
(CIDI, lifetime version 2.1 [42]) was used to assess the
presence of depressive disorders (major depressive dis-
order and dysthymia) and anxiety disorders (generalized
anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social
phobia) at each NESDA wave, in between NESDA
waves, and before enrollment in NESDA.
Symptom severity
Current (past week) severity of depressive and anxiety
symptoms was assessed using the Inventory of Depres-
sive Symptomatology-Self Report (IDS-SR30 [43]), the
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI [44]), and Fear Question-
naire (FQ [45]), respectively.
Statistical analysis
Analyses were conducted in Mplus version 8.3 [46] and
in R version 3.6.2 [47]. using packages qgraph [48] for
network visualization and MplusAutomation [49] for
reading Mplus output into R. All R code and Mplus syn-
tax can be found on OSF (https://osf.io/jzru8/) and the
Mplus syntax of the main analysis in Additional File 2.
Cross-lagged associations (dynamic mental state networks)
To investigate the dynamic associations between our
seven momentary mental states, we fitted a multilevel
multivariate first-order vector autoregressive model
(VAR(1) ) using the Dynamic Structural Equation Model
(DSEM) module in Mplus [38]. There was no multicolli-
nearity among predictors (see Additional file 1: Table
S3); therefore, all seven items were included in the
model. Moreover, visual inspection of participants’ re-
sponses over time revealed no initial elevation bias [50];
therefore, we included all completed assessments in our
model. We evaluated the VAR model assumption of sta-
tionarity, by visual inspection and by means of the
Kwiatkowksi-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin unit root test (KPSS
[51]). We observed one individual with a clear trend;
however, when running our models without this individ-
ual, we did not find results to differ and did not exclude
this individual. The KPSS test indicated that time series
were stationary for the majority of participants (71–91%
2Please note that this is a deviation from our preregistration. We had
planned to model eight mental states instead of seven. During the
modeling process, it appeared that although the model including the
momentary mental state “I feel anxious” (ANX; “Ik voel me angstig”)
converged, the Mplus tracing plots showed convergence problems for
parameters involving this variable. This means that estimates for these
parameters would likely be unreliable. Moreover, proposed sensitivity
analyses would not converge for the eight-variable model. We there-
fore excluded “I feel anxious” from further analyses. “Feeling anxious”
had very low variance in all groups. For transparency, we present the
results of our main analyses which do include “feeling anxious” in Add-
itional File 1 in Supplementary Figures S1-S2
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depending on the variable); we therefore did not linearly
detrend the data.3
Within DSEM, the total variability across individuals
and across time points is decomposed into two compo-
nents: within-person variability and between-person
variability. Each of these parts is modeled separately
[36]. For the within-person part, previous values (at t-1)
of the mental state variables were used to predict mental
state variables at time t. In our case, the majority of as-
sessments were approximately 3 h apart (median = 183
min, IQR = 175–225 min). However, larger intervals also
occurred due to the sampling procedure (no nighttime
assessments) and missed assessments. One important as-
sumption of VAR models is that time series are equally
spaced. This is because the size of the interval between
assessments influences the strength of the estimated
autoregressive and cross-lagged effects [52–55]. To ac-
count for the unequally spaced intervals, we used the
TINTERVAL command in Mplus such that parameter
estimates should be taken to reflect lagged relationships
at an approximately 180-min4 time-interval [38].
At the between level, we modeled the effect of group
membership using dummy variables on the latent vari-
ables that we obtained through the within-level model
(i.e., the autoregressive and cross-lagged parameters
from the within-person level become latent variables at
the between-person level). This allowed us to obtain
point estimates for the average autoregressive and cross-
lagged parameters in each group. Subsequently, we used
the average group cross-lagged effects to calculate lag-2
indirect effects (see Fig. 2) for each group to test our
two research questions (explained in detail below) [56].
We used the default specifications of DSEM, which
performs Bayesian estimation with non-informative
priors based on two independent Monte Carlo Markov
Chains (MCMC) [38]. Bayesian estimation has several
advantages for the estimation and group comparison of
the indirect effects that were of interest in this study.
First, the hierarchical model of interest and subject-
specific parameters model can be directly estimated (ra-
ther than relying on indirect marginal model specifica-
tion as in maximum likelihood-based methods). Second,
the use of MCMC sampling means that we can obtain
posterior distributions for each of the bridge effects re-
ported in this paper, by simply recording at every
iteration the current estimate of each within-person
lagged parameter. This procedure provides both point
estimates and uncertainty estimates (in the form of cred-
ible intervals) which are computed from the posterior
distribution. Using frequentist approaches, it would be
difficult to obtain standard errors and p values of the
same effects. Third, DSEM allows for fitting a single
multivariate model, while separate models for each out-
come variable would have been necessary using a fre-
quentist approach. Lastly, the presence of missing
observations and unequal time-intervals are handled dif-
ferently in DSEM as compared to how they would be
dealt with in frequentist approaches. Namely, during es-
timation of multilevel VAR models using maximum like-
lihood, missing observations are typically deleted, and
unequal time-intervals are typically ignored, likely lead-
ing to biased parameter estimates [55]. In contrast, in
DSEM, missing data are automatically “imputed” as they
are sampled from a posterior distribution during each
MCMC iteration (i.e., resembling a Kalman filter ap-
proach, see [35]). When combined with the TINTERVA
L option (which inserts missing values such that obser-
vations are approximately equally spaced), the bias we
typically introduce by ignoring unequal time-intervals is
avoided. For a more detailed discussion of the differ-
ences between DSEM and frequentist approaches, see
Mcneish and Hamaker [57] and Hamaker et al. [35].
From the estimated posterior distribution for each in-
direct effect, we obtained a point estimate and Bayesian
credible interval (based on the mean and spread of the
posterior, respectively), which quantified the uncertainty
about each effect. We use the credible interval as a
pseudo-significance test (with parameters labeled as “sig-
nificant” if their 95% CI does not include zero). More in-
formation on the preprocessing steps, treatment of
missing data, and DSEM specifications can be found in
Additional File 1 [35–37].
Research question 1: Do overlapping mental states
function as stronger bridge mental states in the
comorbid group as compared to the single disorder
groups?
To test the hypothesis that overlapping mental states
functioned as stronger bridge mental states in the net-
work of participants with comorbidity as compared to
participants with a single disorder, we first estimated all
average within-person indirect effects through both
overlapping mental states (“feeling irritated” and “worry-
ing”) for each group separately. These indirect effects
represent the overall effect from one cluster to another
cluster via the potential bridge mental state. They were
estimated as the cross-product of the group-specific
fixed effects for lagged associations from an anxious
mental state to a bridge state and from a bridge to a
3Please note that this is a deviation from the preregistration. The
preregistration was informed by a previous intensive longitudinal study
during which data was collected during an intervention. For that
study, non-stationarity was therefore expected. Data in the current
study was not collected during an intervention. Additionally, as a sensi-
tivity analysis, we have run our models based on linearly detrended
data, which yielded the exact same results. Plots based on these models
are presented in Additional File 1 Fig. S3-S4.
4Using the shortest time-interval (i.e., 120min) available in the dataset
did not lead us to draw different conclusions.
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depressive state, and vice versa (see Fig. 2 for illustra-
tion), and thus reflect the average within-person indirect
effect in that group. We then summed these indirect ef-
fects, obtaining a group-average summary of all indirect
effects through a potential bridge mental state. For the
remainder of this paper, we will call this summed indir-
ect effect the “bridge effect,” as this measure quantifies
the degree to which the variable acts as a bridge. We
subtracted the value of each bridge effect in the anxiety-
only and depression-only groups from those of the co-
morbid group. This resulted in four difference scores
(two for both overlapping mental states). To determine
whether the estimates (i.e., bridge effects and difference
scores) were different from zero, we inspected whether
zero fell into the 95% credible intervals of the respective
posterior distributions.
Research question 2: Are overlapping mental states the
best bridge mental states?
We examined whether the overlapping mental states “worry-
ing” and “feeling irritated” were most likely to act as bridge
mental states, by evaluating whether their bridge effects were
higher than bridge effects of the non-overlapping mental
states. To this end, we computed the bridge effect for all
mental states in the network. Because “worrying” and “feeling
irritated” are part of both the anxiety and depression mental
state clusters, they could represent either anxiety or depres-
sion mental states in calculating the indirect effects. For in-
stance, in case “feeling down” was treated as bridge mental
state, both the indirect effect of “worrying”→ “feeling
down”→ “feeling listless” (i.e., from anxiety to depressive
mental state via the bridge) and “worrying”→ “feeling
down”→ “feeling nervous” (i.e., from depressive to anxiety
mental state via the bridge) would be part of the bridge effect
for “feeling down.” However, we did not count an effect from
“worrying”→ “feeling down”→ “worrying,” as indirect effects
had to begin and end at a different node. Due to unequal
numbers of items belonging to the depression (3 items) and
anxiety (2 items) mental state clusters, different numbers of
indirect effects contributed to the bridge effects. For the “ori-
ginal bridge states” (“worrying” and “feeling down”), the
bridge effect consisted of 22 indirect effects, while this was
24 when the anxiety mental states were conceptualized as
bridge state, and 26 in case any of the depressive mental
states was considered as bridge state. Due to the differences
in number of indirect effects contributing to the bridge effect,
we report the mean bridge effect for each node and ranked
nodes accordingly. The position of “worrying” and “feeling ir-
ritated” among that ranking was evaluated descriptively.
Sensitivity analyses
We performed two sensitivity analyses to evaluate to
what extent findings among the three groups were influ-
enced by (i) anxiety and depression severity differences
and (ii) recency of diagnoses.5 In the first sensitivity ana-
lysis, we compared the single disorder groups to partici-
pants (n = 46) in the lowest severity tertile of the
comorbid group. Having comorbid disorders is associ-
ated with higher severity of complaints [1]. Severity
differences could drive possible group differences in
dynamic structure, because especially lower levels of se-
verity may coincide with low levels of variability (due to
restriction of range [58]) which in turn may influence
the cross-lagged estimates. In the second analysis, we
compared the single disorder groups to participants (n =
75) of the comorbid group with a current diagnosis (i.e.,
diagnosis in the 6 months prior to the EMA study). This
sensitivity analysis was done post hoc and aimed to
evaluate whether the contrast between groups in terms
of bridge effects would become more pronounced.
Results
Together, the 220 participants completed 14,185 obser-
vations with on average 64.48 (SD = 6.16, range 24–70)
observations per participant. Diagnostic groups did not
differ in sex, age, or the number of EMA assessments
completed. However, there were differences in level of
education, symptom severity, number of diagnoses, and
recency of diagnoses (Table 1). Groups also differed in
intra-individual means for all variables and intra-
individual standard deviations for some of the mental
state variables. Table 2 presents these results. Overall,
the findings from Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the co-
morbid group was worse off compared to the single dis-
order groups. Participants with a depression diagnosis
appeared to be slightly better off than participants with
an anxiety diagnosis, although differences were not sta-
tistically significant.
The estimated average VAR(1) networks for each of the
three groups are displayed in Fig. 3 [59]. Here, group-average
lagged regression parameters which were not significant (i.e.,
have a credible interval that contains zero) are omitted. Sup-
plementary Tables 4 and 5 in Additional File 1 present all
lagged mental state associations for each group and variances
of random effects, respectively. The comorbid group’s net-
work was denser (26 out of 49 edges) than the other two
groups (depression-only, 14/49 edges; anxiety-only, 20/49
edges), and all effects were positive. Furthermore, the comor-
bid group’s network featured the most bidirectional
5Please note that this is a different sensitivity analysis than that was
proposed in our preregistration. Our original plan was to only include
individuals who did not have a current diagnosis (no diagnosis in the
6 months prior to the EMA study; n = 68 in the comorbid group,
n = 33 in the depression-only group, and n = 25 in the anxiety-only
group). This was to evaluate whether effects remained if individuals
with most recent and therefore more severe psychopathology were ex-
cluded. However, because no group differences were observed, it was
not of interest to investigate whether effects remained.
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associations between mental states of the three groups The
largest effect across all groups was found in the anxiety-only
group and concerned the AR effect for “worrying” (beta =
0.36 [95% CI 0.26, 0.41]). The largest cross-lagged effect was
also found in the anxiety-only group and concerned the ef-
fect from “not cheerful” at t-1 to “not relaxed” at t (beta =
0.13 [95% CI 0.06–0.19]). In both the comorbid group and
the depression-only group, there were significant associations
Table 1 Demographics and clinical characteristics compared between the three outcome groups
1. Comorbid disorders at the
same NESDA wave (n = 143)
2. Depressive disorder only
during NESDA (n = 40)
3. Anxiety disorder only
during NESDA (n = 37)
p value
Demographics
Female, n (%)a 100 (69.9) 29 (72.5) 27 (73.0) 0.91
Age, mean (SD)b 48.67 (11.1) 47.38 (14.1) 48.62 (13.3) 0.83
Education, n (%)c 0.08
1. Low 8 (5.6) 1 (2.5) 0 (0)
2. Intermediate 84 (58.7) 17 (42.5) 17 (45.9)
3. High 51 (35.7) 22 (55.0) 20 (54.1)
Born outside the Netherlands (%)c 8 (5.6) 1 (2.5) 4 (10.8) 0.33
Marital status (%)c 0.84
Never married 46 (32.2) 12 (30.0) 15 (40.5)
Currently married 64 (44.8) 21 (52.5) 17 (45.9)
Married living separated 2 (1.4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Formerly married 31 (21.7) 7 (17.5) 5 (13.5)
Employment status—unemployed (%)a 33 (22.4) 3 (7.5) 3 (8.1) 0.03
Psychopathology
Type of disorder
Major depression (%) 143 (100.0) 38 (95) 0
Dysthymia (%) 67 (48.9) 7 (18.4) 0
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)
(%)
89 (64.0) 0 12 (33.3)
Social anxiety disorder (%) 93 (66.4) 0 23 (65.7)
Panic with/without agoraphobia (%) 89 (63.3) 0 15(41.7)
Agoraphobia (%) 52 (38.2) 0 8 (22.2)
Recency* (%)a < 0.001
< 2 weeks 54 (37.8) 1(2.5) 8 (21.6)
2 weeks to < 1month 11 (7.7) 0 1 (2.7)
1 to < 6months 10 (6.9) 6 (17.5) 3 (32.4)
6 to 12months 7 (4.9) 2 (5.0) 1 (2.7)
> 1 to 9 years# 61 (42.0) 31 (77.5) 24 (64.9)
Symptom severity mean (SD)b
Inventory of Depressive Symptoms
(IDS; range 0–84), mean (SD)b
22.42,3 ± 12.7 13.01 ± 9.4 11.31 ± 5.9 < 0.001
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; range
0–63), mean (SD)b
11.72,3 ± 9.7 5.31 ± 5.8 7.01 ± 5.4 < 0.001
Fear Questionnaire (FQ; range 0–
120), mean (SD)b
21.72,3 ± 19.0 8.31 ± 11.7 15.31 ± 13.2 < 0.001
aChi-squared test
bAnalysis of variance (ANOVA)
cFisher’s exact test
1,2,3Numbers refer to groups from which that group differs significantly
*Established at the time of the interview; the EMA study started within 31 days of the interview
#Number of individuals who only met criteria for a diagnosis at the first NESDA measurement; N=5 in comorbid group; N=10 in depression group; and N=12 in
anxiety group
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going from a depression mental state to the bridge mental
state “worrying” to an anxiety mental state. In the comorbid
group, the opposite direction (i.e., anxiety to worry to depres-
sion) was also observed. In all groups, “worrying” featured
more significant effects than “feeling irritated.” In the
depression-only group, there was no significant effect to or
from the mental state “feeling irritated” at all.
RQ 1: Do overlapping mental states function as stronger
bridge mental states in the comorbid group as compared
to the single disorder groups?
In Fig. 4, we have plotted the bridge effects of the over-
lapping mental states “worrying” and “feeling irritated”
for each group. In the comorbid and depression-only
groups, the bridge effect of “worrying” was significantly
Table 2 Descriptives (prevalence of items, person means, within-person standard deviation) of the momentary mental states
Comorbidity group Depression-only Anxiety-only
Percent endorsed






























96.62,3 3.52 (0.73)2,3 1.10 (0.28) 87.81,3 2.84
(0.69)1





98.22,3 3.66 (0.86)2,3 0.97 (0.29) 93.91 3.03
(0.71)1
0.95 (0.33) 94.21 3.01
(0.70)1
0.89 (0.33)
Irritated 49.32 2.09 (0.89)2,3 1.07 (0.40) 22.31 1.48
(0.47)1,3
0.88 (0.42) 36.8 1.70
(0.51)1,2
1.00 (0.40)
Listless 60.42,3 2.48 (1.07)2,3 1.04 (0.38) 30.71 1.75
(0.96)1
0.87 (0.48) 36.71 1.72
(0.61)1
0.92 (0.46)
Down 58.22,3 2.43 (1.21)2,3 0.94 (0.38)3 24.11 1.50
(0.63)1
0.70 (0.48) 28.41 1.47
(0.51)1
0.65 (0.44)1
Nervous 54.02,3 2.22 (1.05)2,3 0.96 (0.39)2 18.91,3 1.37
(0.55)1,3
0.58 (0.43)1,3 39.81,2 1.77
(0.74)1,2
0.88 (0.49)2
Anxious 34.12,3 1.70 ± (0.97)2,3 0.61 (0.41)2 7.01 1.11
(0.26)1,3
0.23 (0.33)1 17.81 1.27
(0.36)1,2
0.47 (0.40)
Worry 72.82,3 3.02 (1.43)2,3 0.94 (0.39) 39.31 1.76
(0.79)1
0.79 (0.47) 56.21 2.19
(1.01)1
0.85 (0.46)
aAnalysis of variance (ANOVA)
bKruskal-Wallis test
1,2,3Numbers refer to groups from which that group differs significantly based on post hoc comparisons: Tukey’s HSD (in case of ANOVA) or Dunn’s test (in case
of Kruskal-Wallis)
Fig. 3 Networks depicting the group-average lagged association (fixed) effects between mental states of the VAR(1) model for the comorbid,
depression-only, and anxiety-only groups. Each node in the network represents a mental state: REL, not relaxed; NER, feeling nervous; IRR, feeling
irritated; WOR, worrying; CHE, not cheerful; LIS, feeling listless; DOW, feeling down. Each edge is the lagged association of that mental state at t-1
(3 h before) with another mental state at t (now). Autoregressive effects (curved arrows from and to the same node) show the influence of the
mental state on itself over time. Green (solid) arrows reflect positive effects over time, while red (dotted) arrows reflect negative effects over time
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different from zero (effect comorbidity 0.024 [95% CI
0.014, 0.035], p < 0.001; effect depression-only 0.017 [95%
CI 0.002, 0.037], p = 0.012), but this was not the case for
the anxiety-only group (effect anxiety-only 0.005 [95% CI
− 0.012, 0.023], p = 0.255). However, the CIs for the differ-
ence between the comorbid and depression-only groups
(delta = 0.007 [95% CI − 0.015, 0.026], p = 0.251), and the
difference between the comorbid and anxiety-only groups
(delta = 0.019 [95% CI − 0.002, 0.039], p = 0.035) included
zero. The bridge effect of “feeling irritated” was not signifi-
cantly different from zero for any of the three groups, nor
different from each other.
The Bayesian credible intervals (CIs) for the comorbid
group are narrower than the CIs of the other two
groups, likely due to the differences in group sizes; in
the first sensitivity analysis that adjusted for the larger
severity and sample size of the comorbid group, CIs of
the comorbid group resembled CIs of the other groups
(see Additional file 1: Fig. S5). Importantly, in this sensi-
tivity analysis, the bridge effect of worrying for the low-
est tertile of the comorbid group was of the same size as
the effect for the depression-only group. The results of
the second sensitivity analysis (see Additional file 1: Fig.
S6, which compared participants in the comorbid group
with current diagnoses (< 6 months prior to EMA assess-
ments) to the single disorder groups, showed a larger
bridge effect for “worrying” in the comorbid group as
compared to the main analysis. The difference in the
bridge effect of worrying between the comorbid and sin-
gle disorder groups became slightly larger (deltacom-dep =
0.012 [95% CI − 0.013, 0.035], p = 0.171; deltacom-anx =
0.024 [95% CI 0.002, 0.047], p = 0.017). Both sensitivity
analyses yielded the same result for “feeling irritated” as
the main analysis, that is, the bridge effect of “feeling ir-
ritated” was not significantly different from zero for any
of the three groups, nor different from each other.
RQ 2: Are overlapping mental states the best bridge
mental states?
Figure 5 presents the mean bridge effect (i.e., bridge ef-
fect divided by number of indirect effects) of each men-
tal state in each group. Within each group, we compared
the mental state with the highest mean bridge effect to
the other bridge mental states (see Table 3). Not “worry-
ing” but “feeling down” featured the highest bridge effect
in the comorbid group. With the exception of “not feel-
ing cheerful,” “feeling down” was also significantly stron-
ger than other mental states in this group. The same
pattern was observed for the anxiety-only group. With
the exception of “not feeling cheerful,” the mean bridge
effect of “feeling down” was stronger than the bridge ef-
fects of all other mental states in this group (estimate =
0.0043 [95% CI 0.0021, 0.0069]). The mean bridge effect
of “not feeling cheerful” was the only effect significantly
different from zero in all three groups (but not different
between groups as CIs overlapped considerably), indicat-
ing that this mental state funnels activity from depressed
to anxiety mental states (and vice versa) irrespective of
the diagnostic label. Again, the CIs in the comorbid
group are generally smaller than those in the other
groups. In all sensitivity analyses, the mean bridge effect
of “feeling down” appeared to have the highest point es-
timate in the comorbid group and anxiety-only group
(see Additional file 1: Fig. S6-S7). However, it differed
Fig. 4 Average within-person summed indirect effects with credible intervals (black lines) going through the overlapping mental states “worrying” and
“feeling irritated,” for the comorbid, depression-only, and anxiety-only groups
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per sensitivity analysis in comparison to which other
bridge mental states the mean bridge effect of “feeling
down” was significantly stronger (see Additional file 1:
Tables S6-S8).
Discussion
In our study, we tested the hypothesis that bridge mental
states play a role in comorbidity among psychiatric dis-
orders. In a sample of individuals with comorbid depres-
sion and anxiety, we did not find clear support for a
bridge function of mental states in their mental state
network. First, we did not find that the two a priori hy-
pothesized overlapping mental states for anxiety and de-
pressive disorders (“worrying” and “feeling irritated”)
had a stronger bridging function in the comorbid group
compared to the single disorder groups. Second, we ob-
served that “feeling down,” a non-overlapping mental
state, featured a bridge effect of comparable strength as
“worrying” in both the comorbid group and the anxiety-
only group. Thus, our findings are not in line with the
bridge symptom hypothesis [10].
Network theory literature has provided numerous
hypothetical examples of which symptoms (i.e., overlap-
ping or non-overlapping) may play which role (e.g.,
forming the link between disorder symptom clusters) in
the development of comorbid disorders. These discus-
sions about the bridge hypothesis have concentrated on
the network’s structure, while limited attention has been
paid to the network’s state, that is, the activation of
symptoms and specifically the timing of this activation
in the context of comorbidity development [60, 61].
Questions such as “when is the activation of bridge
symptoms, or bridge mental states, relevant and detect-
able?” have therefore remained largely unaddressed. An
exception is provided by Borsboom [34], who described
four phases, in which interactions between network acti-
vation and structure are linked to the development of
psychopathology. These can also be applied to the devel-
opment of comorbidity. Borsboom distinguishes (i) an
Fig. 5 Average within-person summed indirect effects with credible intervals (black lines) for each mental state when treating that mental state
as a bridge mental state, for the three groups separately
Table 3 Posterior means and 95% credible intervals (CIs) for the mean bridge effect (i.e., bridge effect divided by the number of
indirect effects) of each mental state in each outcome group
Mental state Comorbidity group, estimate [CI] Depression-only group, estimate [CI] Anxiety-only group, estimate [CI]
Not relaxed 0.0007* [− 0.0001, 0.0014] 0.0005 [− 0.0005, 0.0017] 0.0003* [− 0.0012, 0.0018]
Nervous 0.0011* [0.0005, 0.0018] 0.0001* [− 0.0008, 0.0010] 0.0007* [− 0.0004, 0.0019]
Irritated 0.0002* [− 0.0005, 0.0008] 0.0000* [− 0.0005, 0.0006] − 0.0004* [− 0.0018, 0.0008]
Worrying 0.0014* [0.0008, 0.0021] 0.0009 [0.0001, 0.0022] 0.0003* [−0.0007, 0.0014]
Not cheerful 0.0018 [0.0010, 0.0027] 0.0016 [0.0004, 0.0033] 0.0016 [0.0002, 0.0034]
Listless 0.0003* [− 0.0003, 0.0009] 0.0000 [− 0.0011, 0.0012] 0.0003* [− 0.0006, 0.0014]
Down 0.0028 [0.0018, 0.0039] 0.0005 [− 0.0003, 0.0017] 0.0043 [0.0021, 0.0069]
Estimates accompanied by an asterisk (*) were significantly different from the bridge effect with the highest point estimate (bolded) within that group
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asymptomatic phase, with a dormant structure and no
symptom activation, and thus no active psychopathology
development; (ii) a network activation phase in which an
external event triggers some of the symptoms; (iii) a
symptom spread phase in which connected symptoms
(incl. bridge symptoms) become activated and psycho-
pathology starts to emerge; and (iv) a symptom mainten-
ance phase, in which activation is perpetuated due to a
strongly connected network containing feedback loops
and a full-blown episode of a mental disorder is experi-
enced. Although Borsboom’s account of psychopath-
ology development is quite comprehensive, it reflects a
progressive process that stops at symptom maintenance.
Our view is that symptom remission also forms a rele-
vant part of the course of psychopathology, and may
encompass different phases than those previously men-
tioned. Such a view is in line with the clinical staging
model [62] and with the scar hypothesis [63]. In particu-
lar, it is conceivable that a network underlying risk for a
first episode of a psychiatric disorder is different from a
network underlying risk for a second or third episode
[53]. We therefore suggest to add two additional phases,
a (v) partial remission phase, in which individuals due to
residual symptoms have a heightened risk to return to
phase iii, or alternatively progress to a (vi) full remission
phase, in which risk for recurrence is still higher as com-
pared to individuals in phase i that have never experi-
enced a psychiatric disorder. Determining in which of
these six phases bridge symptoms are relevant and de-
tectable is necessary to establish whether they potentially
can be used to prevent or treat comorbidity. Although
the question concerning the phase in which to detect
bridge effects was not our a priori purpose, our findings
aid in further specification thereof, as discussed
hereafter.
One of our starting points was that network struc-
ture, including the presence of bridge mental states,
reflects underlying vulnerability to developing psy-
chopathology [64–66]. This would mean that we
would be able to observe bridge effects in individuals
vulnerable to experiencing comorbid depression and
anxiety. Our sample therefore included both individ-
uals with (re) current psychopathology and individ-
uals at conceivable risk of recurrence of comorbid
depression anxiety due to previous experience of
these disorders. Given this starting point, and due to
its various strengths, the NESDA-EMAA design pro-
vided an excellent opportunity to test for the ex-
pected group differences in bridge effects between
individuals with comorbid and single disorders. First,
with nearly 400 participants who had been diagnosed
with depression, anxiety, or both, it is one of the lar-
gest EMA studies to date. Second, the diagnostic his-
tory was assessed in multiple waves up to 12 years
prior to EMA assessment for each participant, allow-
ing us to rule out possible comorbidity prior to the
EMA study and to allocate participants to each diag-
nostic group with a high degree of certainty. Third,
the number of EMA assessments (max. 70 per per-
son) in NESDA-EMAA is on the higher range of
what has been used in dynamic network papers [27,
66, 67], and participants had very few missing obser-
vations. However, despite the strengths of this data-
set, we did not find support for any group
differences in bridge effects.
Yet, absence of evidence for the bridge hypothesis does
not imply evidence of absence. This requires us to evalu-
ate what aspects of our design may have impeded find-
ing a role for bridge effects specific to comorbid
disorders. We identified three aspects. First, the current
design did not allow for investigation of the bridge hy-
pothesis during all phases of psychopathology develop-
ment. For instance, our sample did not include
individuals who were in the active phase of developing a
first onset of comorbid depression and anxiety during
the EMA assessment, and would thus be in phase iii.
Participants in the current sample with comorbid de-
pression and anxiety had already experienced both disor-
ders at the time of the EMA assessment, and the vast
majority had their first onset at least 9 years back. Al-
though some participants may have been in the process
of developing comorbidity recurrence (phase iii) during
the EMA assessments, the vast majority of the comorbid
group were likely to be in disease phases iv, v, and vi. If
bridge mental state activity is particularly relevant during
the period that comorbidity first develops or re-develops
(both phase iii), our design, in which we studied a sam-
ple that showed heterogeneity in the phase of illness par-
ticipants were in, was not optimal to detect bridge
mental states. This may be one of the reasons for ob-
serving a null result. In the subset of participants who
were roughly in an active episode (52.4%) (i.e., within 6
months of EMA) (phases iv and v), we observed a stron-
ger bridge effect for “worrying” as compared to the total
comorbid group, which also included a large subset of
individuals in phase vi (42.0%). Although the difference
in bridge effects between the subgroup in this approxi-
mate acute comorbid state and the depression-only
group was still not significant (difference with the
anxiety-only group was significant), it provides some ini-
tial indication that bridge effects are detectable and po-
tentially of relevance in the activated symptom phase
and that bridge effects are difficult to detect or poten-
tially irrelevant in individuals who are vulnerable for co-
morbidity but in remission. If our initial findings are
replicated, such that vulnerable network structures are
completely “dormant” until first symptoms are activated
[34], or reactivated (both phase iii), it may be ineffective
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to target the bridge symptoms in preventative efforts,
unless applied during active phases of comorbidity
(re-)occurrence. The latter, however, is difficult to predict.
Treatment may still be feasible and effective, starting EMA
as soon as patients enter care and have active symptoms.
Clearly, these ideas need further research.
The second design-related aspect pertains our group-
level analyses. Perhaps bridge mental state effects are
only discernible at the level of the individual, and not of
diagnostic groups. Associations between mental states
may vary too much from person to person for average
group-level indirect effects to be meaningful. Post hoc
inspection of variation in the random effects showed
considerable differences between individuals, with lagged
association ranging from negative to positive effects,
which in turn also affected the sizes of the indirect ef-
fects. Individual variation in the size of effects may be
due to heterogeneity in symptom presentation and
therefore also the experience (and personal relevance) of
certain mental states. This is an issue within one dis-
order category [68], and likely even more so in a group
of individuals with comorbid psychopathology. There-
fore, if (i) any mental state (overlapping and non-
overlapping) may function as a bridge, and (ii) this
bridge is different for each individual, falsifying the
bridge symptom hypothesis at the group-level becomes
difficult. Person-specific models might be one way for-
ward. Fisher et al. [69], for instance, modeled networks
consisting of 21 depression and anxiety symptoms for 40
individuals. In their discussion of three exemplar partici-
pants, it was clear that individuals not only starkly dif-
fered from each other, but also that the most important
symptoms for each individual were not necessarily the
principal diagnostic criteria of their diagnoses. Although
person-specific models can provide new insight in
person-specific mechanisms, such models may also re-
quire sampling of a large range of variables for each in-
dividual in order to be able to detect which mental
states are most relevant for a specific individual. Further-
more, testing such complex models that require many
parameters to be estimated will also require much
longer time series in order to obtain reliable estimates
at the individual-level. Although also not without
problems, future research may consider analytical
techniques that provide compromises between idio-
graphic (person-specific) and nomothetic (group-level)
analytical approaches [70, 71].
The third design-related aspect pertains to how we
model symptom dynamics: using a linear multilevel first-
order VAR model fit to data collected at approximately
3-h intervals. Perhaps, bridge-activation dynamics oper-
ate over a shorter or over a much longer timescale than
the interval sampled in our design (for a discussion see
[72]). In the absence of strong theory to inform us about
the optimal lag length at which mental states influence
each other, we estimated a lag 1 VAR model to keep our
model as parsimonious as possible. It is however, con-
ceivable that some of the modeled effects also occurred
over multiple lags, and not accounting for these is thus a
limitation of our study. Data-driven approaches to re-
cover the optimal lag of time-series models are devel-
oped (e.g., DVTEM developed by [73]), but do not yet
exist for models including random effects or that include
more than two variables (i.e., such as the model used in
this study). Further development of theory to inform the
choice of lag length and data-driven tools to model mul-
tiple lag lengths simultaneously is necessary to aid
appropriate modeling of within-person dynamics. More-
over, although VAR models are frequently used to model
psychological dynamics (e.g., [59, 66, 67]), they are
somewhat limited in the types of dynamics they can de-
scribe. For example, while they allow for relating all vari-
ables to one another at the next measurement occasion,
they cannot describe systems which switch from one
stable state (e.g., asymptomatic) to another (e.g., symp-
tomatic) over time [55, 72, 74]. The latter may be some-
thing we expect to observe in individuals moving
between phases of pathology (e.g., phase iii to phase iv).
This limitation may be somewhat mitigated by the use
of more complex statistical models, such as time-varying
VAR models, which allow in principle to whether par-
ameter values change over the study period (see [75], for
an overview). However, these models do not yet have a
multilevel extension, and require much longer time
series to perform acceptably than we have available for
individual participants in the current study (cf. [76]).
The development of more formalized accounts of symp-
tom dynamics is critical in guiding future efforts at cap-
turing dynamic bridge symptom relationships [77].
Absent of such developments, the VAR model is a rea-
sonable first step in approximating those dynamics with
a linear model.
A pertinent question arising from this study is which
mental states should be considered as bridge mental
states in future research? Although the bridge effect of
“worrying” was not significantly stronger in the comor-
bidity compared to the single disorder groups, our find-
ings nonetheless indicate that it did funnel activity from
the depression to anxiety mental state cluster and vice
versa. This seems in line with findings from epidemio-
logical and clinical research, in which “worrying” or re-
lated symptoms such as “ruminating” or “repetitive
negative thinking” have been found to function as a me-
diator between depression and anxiety [78–81], and may
suggest that the mental state worrying reflects a mo-
mentary expression of the symptom worrying. In con-
trast, the other overlapping mental state “feeling
irritated” did not feature a bridge effect in any diagnostic
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group. This effect could not be explained by low within-
person variation in this mental state, as feeling irritated
was one of the most highly varying mental states in
every group. One possibility is that “feeling irritated” is
not a good momentary proxy of irritability as symptom.
Future research is needed to address the link between
symptoms and within-day affect, as currently no study
has examined the association between changes in daily
symptoms and within-day changes in affect. A second
possibility is that our findings indicate that “feeling irri-
tated” is not relevant as bridge mental state, at least in
adulthood. Irritability features in diagnostic criteria of
several anxiety disorders (i.e., GAD, PTSD). While often
associated with major depression [82] and considered an
indicator of depression in children and adolescents in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, DSM-5 [83], irritated mood is not officially part of
the diagnostic criteria for adults. Therefore, irritated
mood might still be an appropriate bridge mental state
or symptom in children and adolescents. This needs to
be further investigated. Likewise, other bridge mental
states or symptoms need to be investigated as well. Cur-
rently, only two bridge mental states were assessed,
while there are many other symptoms (e.g., insomnia
[84]), behaviors (e.g., avoidance behaviors [85]), or cog-
nitive processes (e.g., attributional styles [86]) that have
previously been identified as shared features of depres-
sive and anxiety disorders. Ideally, complex constructs
like avoidance behavior or repetitive negative thinking
would be measured using multiple items. Whether dif-
ferent types of mediators influence development of co-
morbidity in different people would be particularly
interesting follow-up question.
Our finding that “feeling down” featured a large bridge
effect in the comorbidity and the anxiety-only
groups also requires further study. This finding was
somewhat unexpected for two reasons. First, prolonged
“sad mood” is part of the criteria of depression and does
not officially feature in diagnostic criteria for other psy-
chiatric disorders than depression-related syndromes.
Yet “feeling down” included in the EMA might be a less
severe, overlapping, mental state in the sense that it ac-
companies feelings of distress that are present in other
conditions. Second, we had not expected “feeling down”
to play a role in the dynamics of the anxiety-only group.
The majority of this group had never experienced a co-
morbid depression diagnosis and the others not in at
least 9 years. This finding shows two things: (1) appar-
ently, it is more difficult to find “pure” anxiety, than
“pure” depression, which might be a consideration to
keep in mind for studies wanting to improve the current
design, and (2) it shows that subthreshold symptoms (in
this case of depression) that may not be sufficient for
obtaining a comorbid diagnosis may still play a role in
the daily mental state dynamics, which would explain
the presence of bridge effects in this group. Future re-
search is necessary to investigate whether the bridge hy-
pothesis may be more about a matter of degree of risk,
also including risk for subthreshold complaints of a sec-
ond disorder.
Because the bridge symptom hypothesis had not previ-
ously been investigated using dynamical data, we devel-
oped a new approach to estimate bridge mental state
effects. We believe that the current approach for esti-
mating the bridge mental state effect, that is, summing
all indirect effects from the depression to the anxiety-
cluster via the bridge mental states and vice versa, has
face validity. It has conceptual similarity to bridge cen-
trality, which estimates nodes’ bridging function in rela-
tion to multiple symptom clusters [87]. Bridge centrality
has however not been extended to directed networks
based on time-series data, for which it is possible to take
into account that a bridge effect would unfold over mul-
tiple time points (i.e., lags). Future research may come
up with alternative methods to estimate the bridge men-
tal state effects in dynamic data.
A limitation of the current study is that individuals
could start EMA assessments within 31 days of the clin-
ical interview; it was therefore difficult to establish
whether patients at the time of the EMA assessments
were in an acute episode. Also, statistical power is po-
tentially an issue. No standard exists for conducting
power analyses to determine an appropriate sample size
and number of observations in multilevel VAR models
[88]. For multilevel models more generally, power is de-
termined both by the number of participants and re-
peated measures [89]. A recent simulation study of a
multilevel autoregressive (AR) model showed that par-
ticularly the number of participants (and their similarity)
was important for the estimation precision of the param-
eters [90], but these results are difficult to generalize to
a 7-variate VAR model, since it has previously been
shown that sample size requirements for the recovery of
VAR parameter depend heavily on the true parameter
values (particularly the size of the true cross-lagged pa-
rameters [91]). In the current study however, due to
relatively few missing assessments, the average number
of time points per person (i.e., 60 time points) does ex-
ceed the length of the time series used in many previous
analyses of this type (e.g., [59, 92–94]). Although we
have a large sample size for the comorbid group (n =
143), a limitation of the current study is the smaller
sample sizes in the single disorder groups. This means
that average parameter estimates in those groups were
estimated with more uncertainty, and thus should be
viewed in that light.
Finally, it is important to consider that although the
network approach theorizes causal relations between
Groen et al. BMC Medicine          (2020) 18:308 Page 14 of 17
symptom variables, the use of observational data in gen-
eral precludes us from applying a direct causal interpret-
ation to the statistical relationships estimated in the
current paper. For instance, the statistical relationships
estimated here are likely influenced by the presence of
unmeasured confounding variables. Although multilevel
lagged regression models with person mean-centering
have been discussed as a method that can control for
the effect of unmeasured time-invariant confounding
variables (cf. [95]), there are likely numerous unobserved
time-varying confounders present in the current setting
(such as additional unmeasured symptoms, mental
states, and contextual factors). Additionally, misspecifi-
cation of the causal timescale, as previously discussed,
and the functional form of the temporal relationships
would also undermine veracity of causal conclusions
made on the basis of estimated cross-lagged effects [72].
To improve the study of causal symptom relationships,
we likely need to develop a combination of novel experi-
mental manipulations and more precise formal theoret-
ical models of symptom dynamics which incorporate
contextual factors [77].
Conclusion
This study was the first to investigate whether mental
states of “worrying” and “irritability” that are part of
both depression and anxiety serve as bridge mental
states in the daily mental state dynamics in individuals
with comorbid anxiety and depression. Although par-
ticularly “worrying” may still be a candidate in future re-
search, we did not find strong support for a bridging
role in the dynamic mental state network that is specific
to risk for comorbid depression and anxiety. Potentially,
bridge mental state activity is most relevant (and detect-
able) during the period that comorbidity (re-)develops,
or bridge mental states are only detectable in person-
specific networks rather than group-level models. If
bridge mental states in person-specific networks are
found to play a role in the development of comorbid de-
pression and anxiety, these would be highly interesting
targets for treatment in clinical practice. Therefore,
more research is needed, especially prospective studies
during active development of comorbidity and/or at the
individual-level.
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